culture as the challenge of distinguishing between critical and regressively affirmative art in the present. The difficulty lies in the ambiguous nature of contemporary artistic practices, which are often nestled between the ironic critique of the commodified status of art and the self-serving exploitation of art as a commodity (1-8). To be sure, the debates Foster examines in his review of neo-avant-garde experiments no longer center around a wholesale condemnation of mass culture as the fallen site of kitsch. Yet many of the arguments deployed today to evaluate the critical role of mass culture often echo the debates on kitsch as they highlight the loss of a clear-cut criterion of evaluation that would lend itself to connecting aesthetic, ethical, and political issues in a compelling way.' Indeed, the legacy of kitsch, one can argue, has been to promote a critical examination of the once self-evident Western discourse concerning the value of art. It is precisely this inquiry into the premises of aesthetic evaluation that makes the debates on kitsch relevant for our day. In this essay I would like to consider the question of how aesthetic value is established by going back to the reflection of two prominent Austrian modernists, Hermann Broch (1886 -1951 and Robert Musil (1880 -1942 , on the subject of kitsch. As I analyze their discussion of kitsch, I wish to foreground the different ways in which the two thinkers formulated the relation between their discourse and the evaluative processes it enacts. Is aesthetic value a quantity independent of the discourse that distinguishes true art from pseudo-art, or is value a function of this very discourse? How does either type of relation affect aesthetic discourse itself? The distinctive relation between discourse and evaluative process, which distinguishes Broch's and Musil's discussions of kitsch, grounds very different theoretical frameworks for articulating the entwinement of art and morality. Their diverging responses to the challenge of kitsch can serve to frame dilemmas that still confront aesthetic evaluation today. In what follows I will first examine Broch's and Musil's views on ethics and literature against the backdrop of their understanding of modernity. I will then turn to their discussion of kitsch, foregrounding the ways in which the distinction of value between art and pseudo-art is drawn within their respective discourses. Finally I will examine the implications of their discourses on kitsch for aesthetic evaluation.
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005] , Art. 5 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol29/iss2/5 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415. 1604 Musil and Broch were well aware of the numerous ways in which their philosophical and artistic pursuits overlapped.' Their modernist quest for defining the ethical and critical role of literature was informed by the traumatic experience of the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy in the upheaval of the Great War and the affirmation of totalitarianism in the 1930s. This historical horizon was for them emblematic of the centrifugal forces and potential for violence that characterize modernity. Their inquiries into the ethical role of art and literature proceeded from an understanding of modern societies as comprising disparate spheres of experience driven by competing operational logics. Both were concerned with exploring the relation between scientific knowledge and aesthetic cognition against the backdrop of the contemporary, relativistic paradigm in the natural sciences. For both an investigation of aesthetic experience in turn required scrutinizing the relation of the rational to the non-rational. Both regarded the novel and the essay as privileged media for this investigation.
Drawing on a vision of differentiated modernity that recalls Max Weber's, Broch identified the dawn of Western modernity in the collapse of the Judeo-Christian world view following the affirmation of rationality and an empirical mind set. 4 The ensuing loss of a religious-metaphysical center of meaning produced the ethical black hole (literally, a "vacuum of value" or "Wertvakuum") that for Broch defined Western societies at the onset of the twentieth century. This historical development is described in the remarkable essay "Hofmannsthal and his Time" (1946/47) , which identified Vienna as the capital of a gangrenous empire whose disintegration uncovered its actual, hollow core.' The secularized religious yearning that deeply shaped Broch's modernist vision induced him to reject Weber's final diagnosis of an immanent and disjointed modernity and to instead regard the contemporary ethical vacuum as a transitional stage of dehumanization that could potentially give way to a new, unifying value system. This view was sustained by a cyclical notion of history as culminating in epochs of harmony and coherence blessed by the fullness of artistic style. These are necessarily followed by ages of decline and disintegrating value whose hallmark is the preponderance of kitsch. Broch (Precision 206) .
The extensive discussion of the mechanisms of aesthetic experience that unfolds in this essay represents one of two instances in which Musil dwells on the issue of kitsch at any length." If aesthetic experience appears rooted in an alternative emotional mode that grants access to the singular, kitsch configures itself as an aesthetic modality that shuns the task of presenting singular experience and instead reifies it in ready-made formulas. Motion pictures-at stake here is silent film-exemplify this danger by reducing acting to formulaic gestures with stable meanings, "where anger becomes rolling of the eyes, virtue is beauty, and the entire soul is a paved avenue of familiar allegories." This typification in "making connections and working out relations among impressions" is especially detrimental when the issue is conveying the singular emotional experience that for Musil is at the heart of ethics (Precision 203) . Especially the "formulaic abbreviation of the feelings" on which kitsch relies stands in the way of the examination of ethical experience (Precision 206) .
When measured against his extensive discussion of aesthetic experience, Musil's characterization of kitsch in this longer essay appears relatively brief and circumspect. The need to distinguish between good and bad art yields a very general, formal criterion, which denounces any reduction or generalization of singular experience. This marks the great distance that separates Musil from Broch, who instead makes kitsch into a central category of his aesthetic theory Broch's reflection on kitsch over more than two decades, kitsch appears as the perversion of art's intrinsic mission, which is the pursuit of an infinite idea. For Broch, Romanticism represented the cultural constellation that made kitsch possible, for it gave up art's traditional quest for expressing the infinite through finite artworks. In echoing Hegel's arguments in the introduction to Lessons on Aesthetics, Broch faults Romanticism for having elevated the finite to the dignity of the infinite, a substitution analogous to the historical transformation that led the Church to turn away from its pursuit of God as an infinite idea and to instead elevate its earthly institutions to the dignity of the divinity. Precisely this elevation of "the mundane ... to the level of the eternal" forms for Broch the substance of kitsch ("Notes" 62). Kitsch fixates and absolutizes one stage of the system, it specifies a finite idea of beauty, which can then be placed in the service of some other system for the purpose of aesthetic effect. Not coincidentally, Adolf Hitler, as well as the last German kaiser Wilhelm II and the Roman emperor Nero, were fond of beautiful effect and spectacle, which, as the text intimates without further explication, they knew how to exploit ("Notes" 65). Thus kitsch is for Broch not merely bad art, that is, a lesser instance of what counts as legitimate artistic expression. Rather it represents a parasitic "system of imitation," a diabolical double that poses as the system of genuine art. As such it forms a radical, destructive other to art, much as the antiChrist represents the irreducible enemy of Christianity. This is why, as Broch peremptorily concludes, "Kitsch is the element of evil in the value system of art" ("Notes" 63). In masquerading as art, kitsch hinders it in its fundamental mission, namely, the creation of a new myth that can mediate between the irrational chaos of reality and the need for systematizing it. This mythological operation is indispensable for grounding the unifying value system so sorely needed in the present.
The insistence on value reflects Broch's interest in contemporary debates on the concept of value within the human sciences. His understanding of value grows out of his attempt at reconciling the anti-metaphysical, relativistic framework of modern science, on the one hand, with the redemptive power of a metaphysical conception 6 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005] 485) ."
In the context of this description of modernity it would be helpful to examine the ways in which the essay articulates the relation between thought and reality as the foundation for values, an issue to which the logical and the epistemological excursus in sections five and nine are dedicated. Here thinking is presented as a necessary abbreviation and simplification of multidimensional experience. To fulfill this function thinking anchors its infinite, abstract structure in a set of axiomatic truths that are valid at a given moment. The axiomatic system of the present, the text intimates, is consigned to the positivism and relativism of modern science (Sleepwalkers 424-26). Upon closer look, however, the absolute drive of modern science appears grounded in the pursuit of a Platonic idea, which anchors it in a space on the outside of contingent experience. In a move that would be indefensible within the parameters of contemporary scientific thought, the text attributes modern mathematics, one of the most prominent battlegrounds for the scientific revolution at the turn of the century, with a Platonic-theological content. The problematic arguments provided to support this thesis include the assertion that the concept of infinity developed within contemporary mathematics is analogous Divided into six short sections, each addressing one central issue, "Black Magic" begins with the question about the kitschy quality of a familiar type of entertainment in variety theaters, which involved itinerant groups of Hussar soldiers performing sentimental songs. The character of the scene as a "tableau vivant" suspended between art and life compels the narrator to suggest that kitsch is not so much a function of art, its deceptive other, as it were, but rather inheres in some manifestations of life itself. Art then is the medium that makes it possible to recognize kitsch, namely, as that which does not stand up to its test. Or, in the narrator's words, art allows one to remove the kitsch of life: "Is not art then a tool we employ to peel the kitsch off life? Layer by layer art strips life bare" (52)27 Yet this conclusion begs for a more substantive discussion of kitsch, which is taken up in the next section. Here the narrator points to the formulaic emotions triggered by the writer of family magazines. The automatism of emotional reaction, which characterizes kitsch, ultimately grounds in a too rigid connection between the signified of feeling and its linguistic signifier, a connection that is proper to the concept: "Thus kitsch, which prides itself so much on sentiment [Gefiihl] , turns sentiment into concepts" (53) . The problem here does not lie in the shortcomings of available conceptual and verbal structures for articulating feeling, however. Think- Published by New Prairie Press ing legitimately pursues its task of imposing an order on experience by both bundling disparate phenomena into one concept and disarticulating the single concept into many to account for a singular phenomenon (54) . Difficulties arise however when thinking proves unable or unwilling to distinguish between the emotional substance of lived experience and its conceptualization. This makes it possible to deploy a conceptually stable representation of emotions in order to stabilize and sanitize emotional life. As the narrator concludes, "Kitsch affirms itself as something that peels life off of concepts" (53) .18 Kitsch reifies concepts by depriving them of the imprint of lived experience, by erasing the singularity and ambiguity of emotional life.
Significantly, the question that presents itself at this point, "But what is life?" (53) is answered by a tautology: "Life is living: you cannot describe it to someone who does not know it" (54). This deliberately irritating rhetorical gesture serves to shake up the reader, signaling that the discussion is to become even more trying than it has been, given the slippery nature of the terms and the breadth of the issues at stake. Indeed, the text comes to foreground the very intellectual processes that drive it by explicitly thematizing the relation between thought ("Denken") and life ("Leben"). As the narrator suggests, the question about life is really a question of how thinking shapes and is in turn shaped by experience. This intellectual process is lovingly mocked as the narrator recapitulates the discussion of art, kitsch, and life by means of two syllogisms in the second-to-last section. The drastic recourse to syllogistic reasoning ironically reflects the attempt to bring some cogency to a discussion that threatens to run aground in a morass of slippery terminology:
Two syllogisms emerge from these assertions.
Art peels kitsch off of life. Kitsch peels life off of concepts. And: The more abstract art becomes, the more it becomes art. Also: The more abstract kitsch becomes, the more it becomes kitsch.
(54)
The proposed syllogisms seek to exemplify the intellectual processes enacted by the text by schematizing them. In so doing, they aim to expose the structural affinities shared by art and kitsch. At the 10 Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005] , Art. 5 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol29/iss2/5 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1604 same time, the choice of the syllogism suggests that thinking has no other foundations for its operations than its own processes. According to the first syllogism, both art and kitsch consist of a peelingaway operation: art peels kitsch away from life, kitsch peels life away from concepts. Art helps life shed its kitschy layers. These layers are themselves the product of a peeling-away operation, this time as the shedding of the singularity of emotional life from the conceptual structures deployed to denote it. As the second syllogism suggests, the medium of this peeling away is in both cases abstraction. That is, the more art abstracts or peels away the formulaic incrustations from life, the more it becomes art. The same is, however, also true of kitsch. The more abstract kitsch becomes, that is, the more it deprives life's manifestations of their singularity, the kitschier it gets. The question then becomes how to reconcile the claims entailed in the two syllogisms and come to a conclusion or stable definition:
According to the second [syllogism] it appears that kitsch equals art. According to the first, however, kitsch equals concept minus life. Art equals life minus kitsch equals life minus concept plus life equals two lives minus concept. But, according to the second, life equals three times kitsch and, therefore, art equals six times kitsch minus concept.
So what is art? (54) According to the second syllogism, kitsch equals art. This conclusion is, however, undercut by the first syllogism, which stresses that the operation of "peeling away" entails a different type of abstraction for art and kitsch. As the ensuing, humorously absurd formula shows, the attempt at resolving the two syllogisms does not produce a meaningful result but rather derails the reasoning that drives the text. Rather than offering the desired result, this secondto-last section closes with a baffled "So what is art?", which foregrounds the impossibility of offering a satisfactory conclusion linking the phenomena denoted by the terms "art," "kitsch," "concept," and "life." It would be tempting to interpret this text as a testimonial to Musil's early insight into the precarious structure of thinking. In ostensibly uncovering the fundamental indifference of the deferral mechanisms that underlie linguistic and conceptual operations, one might argue, this reflection is bound to derail and undo thinking started, at least apparentlynamely, by the evocation of the Hussars and their irresistible black uniforms. This sight triggers anew the question whether their performance is to be categorized under the heading of "life "art," or is rather just a "tableau vivant": "That is not art! That's life! But why then do we maintain that it's just a tableau vivant?" (55). These last words indicate that the process is about to start again. The black magic to which the title refers can then be seen as an ironic commentary on the vicious circlesthat is, the conceptual paradoxesfaced by thinking when it attempts to elucidate its own conceptual signposts within a self-referential framework. It possibly also points to the wicked effects of disarticulating thinking into all too rigid formulas-the syllogisms-that gnaw at thinking rather than fortify it. After all, black magic entails performing operations that exceed the sphere of action proper to the natural, empirical world and instead trespass into a domain of supernatural, forbidden forces.
It is crucial that the last section does not dwell on the wicked magic that befuddles reflection, but rather returns to the kitschy scene of singing Hussars that provided the initial pretext for the whole discussion. Though momentarily derailed by the examination of its own processes, reflection is nonetheless able to return to examining the puzzling experience which set it off in the first place. Are the singing Hussars real life or just a living tableau? the narrator fearlessly asks in conclusion. The circumstance that the questioning starts again demonstrates that reflection is not impaired by the derailment it incurs when it foregrounds the limitations of its own processes. It would also be misleading to conclude that the text has simply come full circle. Musil's "unfriendly observation" suggests that there cannot be a reflection on art and kitsch, or on art and life, that does not at the same time thematize the mode in which it defines its terms and distinctions of value or draws its conclusions. The reason is that the operational mode of this reflection cannot be anchored in some external terrain, such as Broch's Platonic ideas,
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Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2005] , Art. 5 https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol29/iss2/5 DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1604 but must be assumed as being self-reliant, that is, self-referential. Yet this assumption is bound to derail and weaken the very thought processes which seek to grasp it, as the final formula shows. And yet, even though the process enacted by the text cannot yield the orderly conclusions Broch is able to offer, the reader does not go empty handed, since the text shows that even this paradoxical mode of operation allows for describing the affinities between kitsch and art, which both rely on processes of abstraction, though of a different kind.
Broch's choice to ground his reflection in a metaphysical realm of ideas enables him to offer a discussion of kitsch that proceeds from a grasp of the aesthetic sphere, which lays claim to both synchronic and diachronic totality. This comprehensiveness of vision remains precluded in Musil's text, which is instead compelled to proceed inductively, starting from the contingent experience of kitsch. This framework enables Musil's text to characterize kitsch as the formulaic reduction of feeling, which art can and must expose. Yet the desire to describe kitsch in more detail compels thinking to lay bare the processes that drive it. Hence the difficulties of drawing a distinction between art and kitsch are performatively enacted in a text that offers itself as a metacritique of its own reflection.
What can one learn from Musil' Romer. 2 Consider for instance the development of Marxist criticism since the 1960s. At the one end of the spectrum, Frederick Jameson has described the disengaged pastiche of postmodernism in terms of an imitation of styles that has lost the sense of linguistic norm and can no longer distinguish between plain meaning and parody. The argument according to which imitation accompanies the obfuscation of a shared standard of judgment echoes closely the standard critique of kitsch (quoted in for the description of modernity's atomization in competing life-spheres, whose moral vacuum is reflected in the nihilism of the Viennese fin-de-siecle and epitomized by the perverted style ("Unstil" or "non-style") of Richard Wagner. 9 In drawing on the clumsy neologisms "ratioid/non-ratioid" ("ratidid/ nicht-ratioid"), Musil sought to delimit aesthetic cognition from other cognitive discourses, while at the same time avoiding more familiar terms such as rationality and reason, which had currency in the anti-intellectual critique mounted by contemporary, cultural-pessimistic discourses (see for instance the writings of Walther Rathenau, Oswald Spengler, and Houston Stewart Chamberlain). Deploying neologisms was a way for Musil to avoid all terminological and conceptual proximity to these discourses, whose anti-intellectual and anti-modern bent he firmly condemned. For Musil's discourse on rationality and its relation to emotional experience within the context of contemporary debates, see 10 For Musil's understanding of ethics see his 1913 essay on "Moral Fruitfulness." Precision 37-39. 11 The other instance is found in a brief prose text from 1936, "Black Magic," which will be discussed in the last section of this essay. 12 The three narrative segments constituting The Sleepwalkers represent Broch' s novelistic attempt at providing a diagnosis of his age in order to usher in new values-a project he summed up in the notion of the "polyhistorical novel," which combines the multivalent and perspectival framework of modern science with a synthetic grasp of historical experience. The ten essayistic inserts on the "Disintegration of Value" in the novel's third and last segment, titled "Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit" (translated as "The Realist"), help situate the experience of the numerous characters, most notably that of its ambiguous protagonist Huguenau, within the framework of a sleepwalking humanity in need of redemption.
of scientific relativism (236). Barnouw also criticizes Broch's understanding of a sleepwalking humanity, pointing to the escapist traits of its underlying cultural-conservative view of modernity and the highly ambivalent understanding of mass society and democracy it entails (241-45). Thomas Koebner focuses on the religious underpinnings of Broch's view of cyclical degeneration and regeneration, which informs the redemptive vision at the end of The Sleepwalkers. As Koebner points out, its fundamental premise, according to which redemption can only occur after the affirmation of the greatest possible evil, provides an unwitting legitimation for phenomena like fascism and Hitler's dictatorship, which are assigned a necessary role in such a redemptive scheme 
